Doing business while holding public office: Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry

Research output: Working paper › Research

Standard

Doing business while holding public office : Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry. / Jones, Edward Samuel; Schilling, Felix; Tarp, Finn.

2021. ed. University of Copenhagen, 2021.

Research output: Working paper › Research

Harvard

Jones, ES, Schilling, F & Tarp, F 2021 'Doing business while holding public office: Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry' 2021 edn, University of Copenhagen. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuderg/2108.html>

APA

Jones, E. S., Schilling, F., & Tarp, F. (2021). Doing business while holding public office: Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry. (2021 ed.) University of Copenhagen. https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuderg/2108.html

Vancouver

Jones ES, Schilling F, Tarp F. Doing business while holding public office: Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry. 2021 ed. University of Copenhagen. 2021.

Author

Jones, Edward Samuel ; Schilling, Felix ; Tarp, Finn. / Doing business while holding public office : Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry. 2021. ed. University of Copenhagen, 2021.

Bibtex

@techreport{13e74875578945a9b736285ab9193dd5,
title = "Doing business while holding public office: Evidence from Mozambique{\textquoteright}s firm registry",
abstract = "We link the universe of owners of businesses formally registered in Mozambique since Independence to a new database of politically exposed persons. Recreating the dynamic network of ties between firm owners, we estimate the value of party political and executive mandates to their personal business interests. We find holders of political office attain significantly faster growth not only in the number of companies they own but also in their structural power within the business-owner network, as measured by their {\textquoteleft}godfather centrality{\textquoteright}. Such growth is concentrated in joint-stock firms active in trade and finance sectors and is even larger once we aggregate the analysis to the family-name level. This is consistent with politicians accumulating private sector wealth by acting as rentier-brokers.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, firm registry, beneficial ownership, political connections, rent-seeking, Mozambique",
author = "Jones, {Edward Samuel} and Felix Schilling and Finn Tarp",
year = "2021",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
publisher = "University of Copenhagen",
edition = "2021",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Doing business while holding public office

T2 - Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry

AU - Jones, Edward Samuel

AU - Schilling, Felix

AU - Tarp, Finn

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - We link the universe of owners of businesses formally registered in Mozambique since Independence to a new database of politically exposed persons. Recreating the dynamic network of ties between firm owners, we estimate the value of party political and executive mandates to their personal business interests. We find holders of political office attain significantly faster growth not only in the number of companies they own but also in their structural power within the business-owner network, as measured by their ‘godfather centrality’. Such growth is concentrated in joint-stock firms active in trade and finance sectors and is even larger once we aggregate the analysis to the family-name level. This is consistent with politicians accumulating private sector wealth by acting as rentier-brokers.

AB - We link the universe of owners of businesses formally registered in Mozambique since Independence to a new database of politically exposed persons. Recreating the dynamic network of ties between firm owners, we estimate the value of party political and executive mandates to their personal business interests. We find holders of political office attain significantly faster growth not only in the number of companies they own but also in their structural power within the business-owner network, as measured by their ‘godfather centrality’. Such growth is concentrated in joint-stock firms active in trade and finance sectors and is even larger once we aggregate the analysis to the family-name level. This is consistent with politicians accumulating private sector wealth by acting as rentier-brokers.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - firm registry

KW - beneficial ownership

KW - political connections

KW - rent-seeking

KW - Mozambique

M3 - Working paper

VL - 8

BT - Doing business while holding public office

PB - University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 259874410