Forecasters' Objectives and Strategies
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research
This chapter develops a unified modeling framework for analyzing the strategic
behavior of forecasters. The theoretical model encompasses reputational objectives,
competition for the best accuracy, and bias. Also drawing from the extensive lit-
erature on analysts, we review the empirical evidence on strategic forecasting and
illustrate how our model can be structurally estimated.
behavior of forecasters. The theoretical model encompasses reputational objectives,
competition for the best accuracy, and bias. Also drawing from the extensive lit-
erature on analysts, we review the empirical evidence on strategic forecasting and
illustrate how our model can be structurally estimated.
| Translated title of the contribution | Målsætninger og strategier hos fremskrivere |
|---|---|
| Original language | English |
| Title of host publication | Handbook of Economic Forecasting |
| Editors | Graham Elliott, Allan Timmermann |
| Volume | 2B |
| Publisher | North-Holland |
| Publication date | 2013 |
| Pages | 689–720 |
| Chapter | 12 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-0-444-62731-5 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780444627407 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 |
| Series | Handbooks in Economics |
|---|---|
| ISSN | 0169-7218 |
- Faculty of Social Sciences - Reputational cheap talk, Forecasting contest, Herding, Exaggeration, bias
Research areas
ID: 97141515