Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

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Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences. / Hjorth, Frederik Georg; Adler-Nissen, Rebecca.

In: Journal of Communication, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2019, p. 168-192.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Hjorth, FG & Adler-Nissen, R 2019, 'Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences', Journal of Communication, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 168-192. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqz006

APA

Hjorth, F. G., & Adler-Nissen, R. (2019). Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences. Journal of Communication, 69(2), 168-192. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqz006

Vancouver

Hjorth FG, Adler-Nissen R. Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences. Journal of Communication. 2019;69(2):168-192. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqz006

Author

Hjorth, Frederik Georg ; Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. / Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences. In: Journal of Communication. 2019 ; Vol. 69, No. 2. pp. 168-192.

Bibtex

@article{95f89bc6ae1b4c6ea8ad3bebbaa4b0a2,
title = "Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences",
abstract = "Despite concerns about the effects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative individuals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinformation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the 2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We find that potential exposure to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the finding using a second, validated data set on individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, disinformation, misinformation, fake news, political psychology, Russia, Ukraine, partisan selectivity, ideological asymmetry, communication studies, Political Science, Twitter, social media, social data science",
author = "Hjorth, {Frederik Georg} and Rebecca Adler-Nissen",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1093/joc/jqz006",
language = "English",
volume = "69",
pages = "168--192",
journal = "Journal of Communication",
issn = "0021-9916",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences

AU - Hjorth, Frederik Georg

AU - Adler-Nissen, Rebecca

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Despite concerns about the effects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative individuals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinformation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the 2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We find that potential exposure to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the finding using a second, validated data set on individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.

AB - Despite concerns about the effects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative individuals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinformation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the 2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We find that potential exposure to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the finding using a second, validated data set on individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - disinformation

KW - misinformation

KW - fake news

KW - political psychology

KW - Russia

KW - Ukraine

KW - partisan selectivity

KW - ideological asymmetry

KW - communication studies

KW - Political Science

KW - Twitter

KW - social media

KW - social data science

U2 - 10.1093/joc/jqz006

DO - 10.1093/joc/jqz006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 69

SP - 168

EP - 192

JO - Journal of Communication

JF - Journal of Communication

SN - 0021-9916

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 217349164