Modalization of Movement: The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Modalization of Movement : The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology. / Levin, Kasper; Køppe, Simo; Roald, Tone.

In: Theory & Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 6, 11.12.2019, p. 833–852.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Levin, K, Køppe, S & Roald, T 2019, 'Modalization of Movement: The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology', Theory & Psychology, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 833–852. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354319888685

APA

Levin, K., Køppe, S., & Roald, T. (2019). Modalization of Movement: The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology. Theory & Psychology, 29(6), 833–852. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354319888685

Vancouver

Levin K, Køppe S, Roald T. Modalization of Movement: The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology. Theory & Psychology. 2019 Dec 11;29(6):833–852. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354319888685

Author

Levin, Kasper ; Køppe, Simo ; Roald, Tone. / Modalization of Movement : The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology. In: Theory & Psychology. 2019 ; Vol. 29, No. 6. pp. 833–852.

Bibtex

@article{2e69204cac864edd902e2eb9a3fc3a41,
title = "Modalization of Movement: The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology",
abstract = "One of the most persistent problems in accounting for the constitution of subjective experience is the question of the unity of consciousness. In the phenomenological tradition this question is often approached through concepts such as ipseity, pre-reflective consciousness, ownership, and first-person perspective. Since Aristotle, the question of unity in an experiencing subject has been associated with the notion of “common sensibles” and the concept of “sensus communis” as that which joins the proper sense modalities in a single center. In this article it is argued that both the classical and the phenomenological solutions to the problem of unity point to the central challenge of how to account for the experience of movement and it is questioned whether a phenomenology of movement gets us closer to an understanding of sensus communis as a primordial relational force in the body–world formation.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, movement, phenomenology, sense modalities, sensus communis, subjectivity",
author = "Kasper Levin and Simo K{\o}ppe and Tone Roald",
year = "2019",
month = dec,
day = "11",
doi = "10.1177/0959354319888685",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "833–852",
journal = "Theory & Psychology",
issn = "0959-3543",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Modalization of Movement

T2 - The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology

AU - Levin, Kasper

AU - Køppe, Simo

AU - Roald, Tone

PY - 2019/12/11

Y1 - 2019/12/11

N2 - One of the most persistent problems in accounting for the constitution of subjective experience is the question of the unity of consciousness. In the phenomenological tradition this question is often approached through concepts such as ipseity, pre-reflective consciousness, ownership, and first-person perspective. Since Aristotle, the question of unity in an experiencing subject has been associated with the notion of “common sensibles” and the concept of “sensus communis” as that which joins the proper sense modalities in a single center. In this article it is argued that both the classical and the phenomenological solutions to the problem of unity point to the central challenge of how to account for the experience of movement and it is questioned whether a phenomenology of movement gets us closer to an understanding of sensus communis as a primordial relational force in the body–world formation.

AB - One of the most persistent problems in accounting for the constitution of subjective experience is the question of the unity of consciousness. In the phenomenological tradition this question is often approached through concepts such as ipseity, pre-reflective consciousness, ownership, and first-person perspective. Since Aristotle, the question of unity in an experiencing subject has been associated with the notion of “common sensibles” and the concept of “sensus communis” as that which joins the proper sense modalities in a single center. In this article it is argued that both the classical and the phenomenological solutions to the problem of unity point to the central challenge of how to account for the experience of movement and it is questioned whether a phenomenology of movement gets us closer to an understanding of sensus communis as a primordial relational force in the body–world formation.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - movement

KW - phenomenology

KW - sense modalities

KW - sensus communis

KW - subjectivity

U2 - 10.1177/0959354319888685

DO - 10.1177/0959354319888685

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 833

EP - 852

JO - Theory & Psychology

JF - Theory & Psychology

SN - 0959-3543

IS - 6

ER -

ID: 219571324