Nudging climate change mitigation: A laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Standard

Nudging climate change mitigation: A laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods. / Böhm, Robert; Gürerk, Özgür; Lauer, Thomas.

In: Games, Vol. 11, No. 4, 42, 2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Böhm, R, Gürerk, Ö & Lauer, T 2020, 'Nudging climate change mitigation: A laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods', Games, vol. 11, no. 4, 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040042

APA

Böhm, R., Gürerk, Ö., & Lauer, T. (2020). Nudging climate change mitigation: A laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods. Games, 11(4), [42]. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040042

Vancouver

Böhm R, Gürerk Ö, Lauer T. Nudging climate change mitigation: A laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods. Games. 2020;11(4). 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040042

Author

Böhm, Robert ; Gürerk, Özgür ; Lauer, Thomas. / Nudging climate change mitigation: A laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods. In: Games. 2020 ; Vol. 11, No. 4.

Bibtex

@article{728f9efc70524bad93431d5721a3e0ae,
title = "Nudging climate change mitigation: A laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods",
abstract = "To avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change, humans need to overcome two intertwined conflicts. First, they must deal with an intra-generational conflict that emerges from the allocation of costs of climate change mitigation among different actors of the current generation. Second, they face an inter-generational conflict that stems from the higher costs for long-term mitigation measures, particularly helping future generations, compared to the short-term actions aimed at adapting to the immediate effects of climate change, benefiting mostly the current generation. We devise a novel game to study this multi-level conflict and investigate individuals{\textquoteright} behavior in a lab experiment. We find that, although individuals reach sufficient cooperation levels to avoid adverse consequences for their own generation, they contribute more to cheaper short-term than to costlier long-term measures, to the detriment of future generations. Simple “nudge” interventions, however, may alter this pattern considerably. We find that changing the default contribution level to the inter-generational welfare optimum increases long-term contributions. Moreover, providing individuals with the possibility to commit themselves to inter-generational solidarity leads to an even stronger increase in long-term contributions. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that nudges alone may not be enough to induce inter-generationally optimal contributions. ",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, climate change, experiment, social dilemma, inter-generational, nudging",
author = "Robert B{\"o}hm and {\"O}zg{\"u}r G{\"u}rerk and Thomas Lauer",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.3390/g11040042",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
journal = "Games",
issn = "2073-4336",
publisher = "Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI)",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Nudging climate change mitigation: A laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods

AU - Böhm, Robert

AU - Gürerk, Özgür

AU - Lauer, Thomas

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - To avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change, humans need to overcome two intertwined conflicts. First, they must deal with an intra-generational conflict that emerges from the allocation of costs of climate change mitigation among different actors of the current generation. Second, they face an inter-generational conflict that stems from the higher costs for long-term mitigation measures, particularly helping future generations, compared to the short-term actions aimed at adapting to the immediate effects of climate change, benefiting mostly the current generation. We devise a novel game to study this multi-level conflict and investigate individuals’ behavior in a lab experiment. We find that, although individuals reach sufficient cooperation levels to avoid adverse consequences for their own generation, they contribute more to cheaper short-term than to costlier long-term measures, to the detriment of future generations. Simple “nudge” interventions, however, may alter this pattern considerably. We find that changing the default contribution level to the inter-generational welfare optimum increases long-term contributions. Moreover, providing individuals with the possibility to commit themselves to inter-generational solidarity leads to an even stronger increase in long-term contributions. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that nudges alone may not be enough to induce inter-generationally optimal contributions.

AB - To avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change, humans need to overcome two intertwined conflicts. First, they must deal with an intra-generational conflict that emerges from the allocation of costs of climate change mitigation among different actors of the current generation. Second, they face an inter-generational conflict that stems from the higher costs for long-term mitigation measures, particularly helping future generations, compared to the short-term actions aimed at adapting to the immediate effects of climate change, benefiting mostly the current generation. We devise a novel game to study this multi-level conflict and investigate individuals’ behavior in a lab experiment. We find that, although individuals reach sufficient cooperation levels to avoid adverse consequences for their own generation, they contribute more to cheaper short-term than to costlier long-term measures, to the detriment of future generations. Simple “nudge” interventions, however, may alter this pattern considerably. We find that changing the default contribution level to the inter-generational welfare optimum increases long-term contributions. Moreover, providing individuals with the possibility to commit themselves to inter-generational solidarity leads to an even stronger increase in long-term contributions. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that nudges alone may not be enough to induce inter-generationally optimal contributions.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - climate change

KW - experiment

KW - social dilemma

KW - inter-generational

KW - nudging

U2 - 10.3390/g11040042

DO - 10.3390/g11040042

M3 - Journal article

VL - 11

JO - Games

JF - Games

SN - 2073-4336

IS - 4

M1 - 42

ER -

ID: 249906076