Parochial versus universal cooperation: Introducing a novel economic game of within- and between-group interaction

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Parochial versus universal cooperation: Introducing a novel economic game of within- and between-group interaction. / Aaldering, Hillie; Böhm, Robert.

In: Social Psychological and Personality Science, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2020, p. 36-45.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Aaldering, H & Böhm, R 2020, 'Parochial versus universal cooperation: Introducing a novel economic game of within- and between-group interaction', Social Psychological and Personality Science, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 36-45. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619841627

APA

Aaldering, H., & Böhm, R. (2020). Parochial versus universal cooperation: Introducing a novel economic game of within- and between-group interaction. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 11(1), 36-45. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619841627

Vancouver

Aaldering H, Böhm R. Parochial versus universal cooperation: Introducing a novel economic game of within- and between-group interaction. Social Psychological and Personality Science. 2020;11(1):36-45. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619841627

Author

Aaldering, Hillie ; Böhm, Robert. / Parochial versus universal cooperation: Introducing a novel economic game of within- and between-group interaction. In: Social Psychological and Personality Science. 2020 ; Vol. 11, No. 1. pp. 36-45.

Bibtex

@article{b5f5195da4294cdd9fa46aae5d1490fa,
title = "Parochial versus universal cooperation: Introducing a novel economic game of within- and between-group interaction",
abstract = "Engaging in personally costly within-group cooperation benefits one{\textquoteright}s in-group members but also impacts other groups by benefiting, neglecting, or harming out-group members, leading to a range of potential consequences for between-group relations (e.g., collaboration vs. competition). We introduce the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation (IPUC) game to investigate the prevalence of the individual preferences underlying these different expressions of within-group cooperation: universalism, weak parochialism, and strong parochialism. In two online experiments with natural groups, we show that the IPUC has value beyond existing economic games in measuring these preferences separately. In a third experiment conducted in the lab, we show how dispositional measures traditionally associated with within- and between-group cooperation, that is, social value orientation, social dominance orientation, honesty-humility, and empathic concern, predict different preferences. Thus, the IPUC provides a tool to better understand within- and between-group interactions and to test interventions to overcome intergroup conflict.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, cooperation, intergroup conflict, parochialism, economic game, social dilemma",
author = "Hillie Aaldering and Robert B{\"o}hm",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1177/1948550619841627",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "36--45",
journal = "Social Psychological and Personality Science",
issn = "1948-5506",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Parochial versus universal cooperation: Introducing a novel economic game of within- and between-group interaction

AU - Aaldering, Hillie

AU - Böhm, Robert

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Engaging in personally costly within-group cooperation benefits one’s in-group members but also impacts other groups by benefiting, neglecting, or harming out-group members, leading to a range of potential consequences for between-group relations (e.g., collaboration vs. competition). We introduce the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation (IPUC) game to investigate the prevalence of the individual preferences underlying these different expressions of within-group cooperation: universalism, weak parochialism, and strong parochialism. In two online experiments with natural groups, we show that the IPUC has value beyond existing economic games in measuring these preferences separately. In a third experiment conducted in the lab, we show how dispositional measures traditionally associated with within- and between-group cooperation, that is, social value orientation, social dominance orientation, honesty-humility, and empathic concern, predict different preferences. Thus, the IPUC provides a tool to better understand within- and between-group interactions and to test interventions to overcome intergroup conflict.

AB - Engaging in personally costly within-group cooperation benefits one’s in-group members but also impacts other groups by benefiting, neglecting, or harming out-group members, leading to a range of potential consequences for between-group relations (e.g., collaboration vs. competition). We introduce the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation (IPUC) game to investigate the prevalence of the individual preferences underlying these different expressions of within-group cooperation: universalism, weak parochialism, and strong parochialism. In two online experiments with natural groups, we show that the IPUC has value beyond existing economic games in measuring these preferences separately. In a third experiment conducted in the lab, we show how dispositional measures traditionally associated with within- and between-group cooperation, that is, social value orientation, social dominance orientation, honesty-humility, and empathic concern, predict different preferences. Thus, the IPUC provides a tool to better understand within- and between-group interactions and to test interventions to overcome intergroup conflict.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - cooperation

KW - intergroup conflict

KW - parochialism

KW - economic game

KW - social dilemma

U2 - 10.1177/1948550619841627

DO - 10.1177/1948550619841627

M3 - Journal article

VL - 11

SP - 36

EP - 45

JO - Social Psychological and Personality Science

JF - Social Psychological and Personality Science

SN - 1948-5506

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 241307796