Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods

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We study pure redistribution as a device to increase cooperation and efficiency in the provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The first stage is the standard linear public goods game. In the second stage, subjects can redistribute payoffs among other subjects in their group. We find that cooperation and efficiency increases substantially with this redistribution scheme, and that the redistribution option is popular. Our results provide an intuitive explanation for why an imposed redistribution rule, as proposed by Falkinger (1996), is capable of sustaining cooperation in the provision of public goods
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationCph.
PublisherDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Number of pages7
Publication statusPublished - 2006

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ID: 313247