Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts: Evidence from Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania

Research output: Working paper › Research

Standard

Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts : Evidence from Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania. / Lassen, David Dreyer; Lilleør, Helene Bie.

Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008.

Research output: Working paper › Research

Harvard

Lassen, DD & Lilleør, HB 2008 'Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts: Evidence from Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania' Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Lassen, D. D., & Lilleør, H. B. (2008). Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts: Evidence from Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Lassen DD, Lilleør HB. Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts: Evidence from Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2008.

Author

Lassen, David Dreyer ; Lilleør, Helene Bie. / Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts : Evidence from Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008.

Bibtex

@techreport{b26abce062c211dd8d9f000ea68e967b,
title = "Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts: Evidence from Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania",
abstract = "This paper carries out a theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of informal institutions in facilitating intergenerational contracts governing investments in schooling and payments of pensions in the form of remittances. We show, using detailed household level data from rural Tanzania, that informal institutions of social control, rooted in tribal affiliations, determine both the household's investment in schooling and the probability that it receives remittances from migrants. This is consistent with a framework in which households' expected returns in the form of remittances, which is determined partly by the prospects of social control over migrants, influence current investments in schooling.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Afrika, social compact, human capital, traditions, ethnicity, ethnic diversity, social capital, Africa",
author = "Lassen, {David Dreyer} and Lille{\o}r, {Helene Bie}",
note = "JEL classification: D130, O150",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
publisher = "Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts

T2 - Evidence from Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania

AU - Lassen, David Dreyer

AU - Lilleør, Helene Bie

N1 - JEL classification: D130, O150

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - This paper carries out a theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of informal institutions in facilitating intergenerational contracts governing investments in schooling and payments of pensions in the form of remittances. We show, using detailed household level data from rural Tanzania, that informal institutions of social control, rooted in tribal affiliations, determine both the household's investment in schooling and the probability that it receives remittances from migrants. This is consistent with a framework in which households' expected returns in the form of remittances, which is determined partly by the prospects of social control over migrants, influence current investments in schooling.

AB - This paper carries out a theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of informal institutions in facilitating intergenerational contracts governing investments in schooling and payments of pensions in the form of remittances. We show, using detailed household level data from rural Tanzania, that informal institutions of social control, rooted in tribal affiliations, determine both the household's investment in schooling and the probability that it receives remittances from migrants. This is consistent with a framework in which households' expected returns in the form of remittances, which is determined partly by the prospects of social control over migrants, influence current investments in schooling.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Afrika

KW - social compact

KW - human capital

KW - traditions

KW - ethnicity

KW - ethnic diversity

KW - social capital

KW - Africa

M3 - Working paper

BT - Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts

PB - Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 5362426