Monetary policy during speculative attacks: Are there adverse medium term effects?

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Monetary policy during speculative attacks : Are there adverse medium term effects? / Bergman, Ulf Michael; Jellingsø, Mads.

In: North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, p. 5-18.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Bergman, UM & Jellingsø, M 2010, 'Monetary policy during speculative attacks: Are there adverse medium term effects?', North American Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 5-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2009.11.002

APA

Bergman, U. M., & Jellingsø, M. (2010). Monetary policy during speculative attacks: Are there adverse medium term effects? North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 21(1), 5-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2009.11.002

Vancouver

Bergman UM, Jellingsø M. Monetary policy during speculative attacks: Are there adverse medium term effects? North American Journal of Economics and Finance. 2010;21(1):5-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2009.11.002

Author

Bergman, Ulf Michael ; Jellingsø, Mads. / Monetary policy during speculative attacks : Are there adverse medium term effects?. In: North American Journal of Economics and Finance. 2010 ; Vol. 21, No. 1. pp. 5-18.

Bibtex

@article{0d24b3b02b6311df8ed1000ea68e967b,
title = "Monetary policy during speculative attacks: Are there adverse medium term effects?",
abstract = "This paper extends the currency crises model of Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001, 2004) in different directions. Our main result is that a tight monetary policy can have adverse effects beyond the short term and can potentially cause a currency crisis in the medium term, even in cases when the interest rate defense is successful and prevented a currency crisis in the short-run. In addition, we add a risk premium and find that this increases the likelihood of a crisis, can help explain contagion, and that prospective capital controls will increase the likelihood that such controls will be needed as an emergency measure.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, foreign-currency debt, balance sheets, interest parity, risk premium, contagion, prospective capital control, monetary policy",
author = "Bergman, {Ulf Michael} and Mads Jellings{\o}",
note = "JEL classification: E51, F30, O11",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1016/j.najef.2009.11.002",
language = "English",
volume = "21",
pages = "5--18",
journal = "North American Journal of Economics and Finance",
issn = "1062-9408",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Monetary policy during speculative attacks

T2 - Are there adverse medium term effects?

AU - Bergman, Ulf Michael

AU - Jellingsø, Mads

N1 - JEL classification: E51, F30, O11

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This paper extends the currency crises model of Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001, 2004) in different directions. Our main result is that a tight monetary policy can have adverse effects beyond the short term and can potentially cause a currency crisis in the medium term, even in cases when the interest rate defense is successful and prevented a currency crisis in the short-run. In addition, we add a risk premium and find that this increases the likelihood of a crisis, can help explain contagion, and that prospective capital controls will increase the likelihood that such controls will be needed as an emergency measure.

AB - This paper extends the currency crises model of Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001, 2004) in different directions. Our main result is that a tight monetary policy can have adverse effects beyond the short term and can potentially cause a currency crisis in the medium term, even in cases when the interest rate defense is successful and prevented a currency crisis in the short-run. In addition, we add a risk premium and find that this increases the likelihood of a crisis, can help explain contagion, and that prospective capital controls will increase the likelihood that such controls will be needed as an emergency measure.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - foreign-currency debt

KW - balance sheets

KW - interest parity

KW - risk premium

KW - contagion

KW - prospective capital control

KW - monetary policy

U2 - 10.1016/j.najef.2009.11.002

DO - 10.1016/j.najef.2009.11.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 21

SP - 5

EP - 18

JO - North American Journal of Economics and Finance

JF - North American Journal of Economics and Finance

SN - 1062-9408

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 18475093