TY - JOUR

T1 - Praetorius, N. (2004) Intersubjectivity of Cognition and language. Principled Reasons why the Subject may be Trusted. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3, 195-214

AU - Praetorius, Nini

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather,principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and description. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences for cognitive research and for functional theories of mind

AB - The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather,principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and description. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences for cognitive research and for functional theories of mind

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - consciousness, cognition, intersubjectivity, language, subjectivity

M3 - Journal article

VL - 3

SP - 195

EP - 214

JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

SN - 1568-7759

ER -