Strategic Self-Ignorance

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Strategic Self-Ignorance. / Thunström, Linda ; Nordström, Leif Jonas; Shogren, Jason F.; Ehmke, Mariah ; van 't Veld, Klaas .

Lund : Department of Economics, Lund University, 2013.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Thunström, L, Nordström, LJ, Shogren, JF, Ehmke, M & van 't Veld, K 2013 'Strategic Self-Ignorance' Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund. <http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2013_017.htm>

APA

Thunström, L., Nordström, L. J., Shogren, J. F., Ehmke, M., & van 't Veld, K. (2013). Strategic Self-Ignorance. Department of Economics, Lund University. Working Paper Department of Economics, Lund University No. 2013:17 http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2013_017.htm

Vancouver

Thunström L, Nordström LJ, Shogren JF, Ehmke M, van 't Veld K. Strategic Self-Ignorance. Lund: Department of Economics, Lund University. 2013.

Author

Thunström, Linda ; Nordström, Leif Jonas ; Shogren, Jason F. ; Ehmke, Mariah ; van 't Veld, Klaas . / Strategic Self-Ignorance. Lund : Department of Economics, Lund University, 2013. (Working Paper Department of Economics, Lund University; No. 2013:17).

Bibtex

@techreport{f104a53fff2b4224b95a82d6c74958fd,
title = "Strategic Self-Ignorance",
abstract = "We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to overindulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one{\textquoteright}s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals — a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Experiment, INFORMATION, Ignorance",
author = "Linda Thunstr{\"o}m and Nordstr{\"o}m, {Leif Jonas} and Shogren, {Jason F.} and Mariah Ehmke and {van 't Veld}, Klaas",
year = "2013",
language = "English",
series = "Working Paper Department of Economics, Lund University",
publisher = "Department of Economics, Lund University",
number = "2013:17",
address = "Sweden",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, Lund University",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Strategic Self-Ignorance

AU - Thunström, Linda

AU - Nordström, Leif Jonas

AU - Shogren, Jason F.

AU - Ehmke, Mariah

AU - van 't Veld, Klaas

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to overindulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals — a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.

AB - We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to overindulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals — a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Experiment

KW - INFORMATION

KW - Ignorance

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Working Paper Department of Economics, Lund University

BT - Strategic Self-Ignorance

PB - Department of Economics, Lund University

CY - Lund

ER -

ID: 51506967