The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates: A note on the US 2016 presidential election

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The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates : A note on the US 2016 presidential election. / Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter.

Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), 2016.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Kurrild-Klitgaard, P 2016 'The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates: A note on the US 2016 presidential election' Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69171/1/MPRA_paper_69171.pdf>

APA

Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2016). The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates: A note on the US 2016 presidential election. Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). MPRA Paper Vol. 2016 No. 69171 https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69171/1/MPRA_paper_69171.pdf

Vancouver

Kurrild-Klitgaard P. The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates: A note on the US 2016 presidential election. Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA). 2016 Feb 1.

Author

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter. / The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates : A note on the US 2016 presidential election. Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), 2016. (MPRA Paper; No. 69171, Vol. 2016).

Bibtex

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title = "The cyclical social choice of primary vs. general election candidates: A note on the US 2016 presidential election",
abstract = "The manner in which US presidential elections are organized make them ripe for empirical manifestations of the “voting paradoxes” identified by social choice theorists. This note illustrates the general point with polling data involving the two leading Democrats and the three leading Republicans at the beginning of the 2016 presidential primaries, suggesting that all five candidates may be alternatives in one or more cyclical majorities, i.e., where no candidate cannot be beaten by at least one other ",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, social choice, Condorcet paradox, Borda paradox, US presidential election 2016, Hillary Clinton, Bernard Sanders, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio",
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N2 - The manner in which US presidential elections are organized make them ripe for empirical manifestations of the “voting paradoxes” identified by social choice theorists. This note illustrates the general point with polling data involving the two leading Democrats and the three leading Republicans at the beginning of the 2016 presidential primaries, suggesting that all five candidates may be alternatives in one or more cyclical majorities, i.e., where no candidate cannot be beaten by at least one other

AB - The manner in which US presidential elections are organized make them ripe for empirical manifestations of the “voting paradoxes” identified by social choice theorists. This note illustrates the general point with polling data involving the two leading Democrats and the three leading Republicans at the beginning of the 2016 presidential primaries, suggesting that all five candidates may be alternatives in one or more cyclical majorities, i.e., where no candidate cannot be beaten by at least one other

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KW - social choice

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KW - Borda paradox

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KW - Hillary Clinton

KW - Bernard Sanders

KW - Donald Trump

KW - Ted Cruz

KW - Marco Rubio

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