The Origins of Governments: From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

The Origins of Governments : From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy. / Baker, Matthew; Bulte, Erwin; Weisdorf, Jacob Louis.

Cph. : Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2006.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Baker, M, Bulte, E & Weisdorf, JL 2006 'The Origins of Governments: From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Cph.

APA

Baker, M., Bulte, E., & Weisdorf, J. L. (2006). The Origins of Governments: From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Baker M, Bulte E, Weisdorf JL. The Origins of Governments: From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy. Cph.: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2006.

Author

Baker, Matthew ; Bulte, Erwin ; Weisdorf, Jacob Louis. / The Origins of Governments : From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy. Cph. : Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2006.

Bibtex

@techreport{de5d0b509b4511dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "The Origins of Governments: From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy",
abstract = "We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally “switch” from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society{\textquoteright}s surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be “trapped” at lower levels of technology – perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model{\textquoteright}s main predictions",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, origins of institutions, common defense, raiding, hunter-gatherers, SCCS",
author = "Matthew Baker and Erwin Bulte and Weisdorf, {Jacob Louis}",
note = "JEL Classification: D74, O10, N4",
year = "2006",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The Origins of Governments

T2 - From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy

AU - Baker, Matthew

AU - Bulte, Erwin

AU - Weisdorf, Jacob Louis

N1 - JEL Classification: D74, O10, N4

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally “switch” from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society’s surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be “trapped” at lower levels of technology – perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model’s main predictions

AB - We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally “switch” from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society’s surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be “trapped” at lower levels of technology – perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model’s main predictions

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - origins of institutions

KW - common defense

KW - raiding

KW - hunter-gatherers

KW - SCCS

M3 - Working paper

BT - The Origins of Governments

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

CY - Cph.

ER -

ID: 313260