The politics of digits: Evidence of odd taxation

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

The politics of digits : Evidence of odd taxation. / Olsen, Asmus Leth.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 154, No. 1-2, 2013, p. 59-73.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Olsen, AL 2013, 'The politics of digits: Evidence of odd taxation', Public Choice, vol. 154, no. 1-2, pp. 59-73. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9807-x

APA

Olsen, A. L. (2013). The politics of digits: Evidence of odd taxation. Public Choice, 154(1-2), 59-73. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9807-x

Vancouver

Olsen AL. The politics of digits: Evidence of odd taxation. Public Choice. 2013;154(1-2):59-73. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9807-x

Author

Olsen, Asmus Leth. / The politics of digits : Evidence of odd taxation. In: Public Choice. 2013 ; Vol. 154, No. 1-2. pp. 59-73.

Bibtex

@article{fc5b3151185d4da68ae65225afc456cd,
title = "The politics of digits: Evidence of odd taxation",
abstract = "From the concept of odd pricing, i.e., setting rightmost price digits below a whole number, this paper advances the political counterpart of odd taxation using a panel of Danish municipal taxes. First, the distribution of tax decimals is non-uniform and resembles the distribution of price-endings data. Second, nine-ending and other higher-end decimals are found to be over-represented which echoes odd pricing research. It suggests that incumbents take voters{\textquoteright} biases into account and apply odd taxes to minimize the political costs of taxation while maximizing revenue. Attention should be given to how policy digits are arranged to exploit voters{\textquoteright} cognitive biases.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, tax policy, incumbent behavior, odd pricing, local govnments, public choice, gaming, political behavior, political economy, Policy and Organisational Management",
author = "Olsen, {Asmus Leth}",
note = "Udgivet online i 2011",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1007/s11127-011-9807-x",
language = "English",
volume = "154",
pages = "59--73",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The politics of digits

T2 - Evidence of odd taxation

AU - Olsen, Asmus Leth

N1 - Udgivet online i 2011

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - From the concept of odd pricing, i.e., setting rightmost price digits below a whole number, this paper advances the political counterpart of odd taxation using a panel of Danish municipal taxes. First, the distribution of tax decimals is non-uniform and resembles the distribution of price-endings data. Second, nine-ending and other higher-end decimals are found to be over-represented which echoes odd pricing research. It suggests that incumbents take voters’ biases into account and apply odd taxes to minimize the political costs of taxation while maximizing revenue. Attention should be given to how policy digits are arranged to exploit voters’ cognitive biases.

AB - From the concept of odd pricing, i.e., setting rightmost price digits below a whole number, this paper advances the political counterpart of odd taxation using a panel of Danish municipal taxes. First, the distribution of tax decimals is non-uniform and resembles the distribution of price-endings data. Second, nine-ending and other higher-end decimals are found to be over-represented which echoes odd pricing research. It suggests that incumbents take voters’ biases into account and apply odd taxes to minimize the political costs of taxation while maximizing revenue. Attention should be given to how policy digits are arranged to exploit voters’ cognitive biases.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - tax policy

KW - incumbent behavior

KW - odd pricing

KW - local govnments

KW - public choice

KW - gaming

KW - political behavior

KW - political economy

KW - Policy and Organisational Management

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-011-9807-x

DO - 10.1007/s11127-011-9807-x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 154

SP - 59

EP - 73

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 1-2

ER -

ID: 33539184