Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

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Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods : Experimental Evidence. / Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert.

In: Finanzarchiv, Vol. 66, No. 1, 2010, p. 34-64.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Rauchdobler, J, Sausgruber, R & Tyran, J-R 2010, 'Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence', Finanzarchiv, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 34-64. https://doi.org/10.1628/001522110X503370

APA

Rauchdobler, J., Sausgruber, R., & Tyran, J-R. (2010). Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence. Finanzarchiv, 66(1), 34-64. https://doi.org/10.1628/001522110X503370

Vancouver

Rauchdobler J, Sausgruber R, Tyran J-R. Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence. Finanzarchiv. 2010;66(1):34-64. https://doi.org/10.1628/001522110X503370

Author

Rauchdobler, Julian ; Sausgruber, Rupert ; Tyran, Jean-Robert. / Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods : Experimental Evidence. In: Finanzarchiv. 2010 ; Vol. 66, No. 1. pp. 34-64.

Bibtex

@article{bb5c2e6094bb11df928f000ea68e967b,
title = "Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence",
abstract = "Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed thresholds are ineffective at best and often counterproductive. This holds over a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We test whether thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e., whether a threshold is approved in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and commitment effects, but they are not strong enough to significantly improve the efficiency of thresholds.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, provision of public goods, threshold, voting, experiments",
author = "Julian Rauchdobler and Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran",
note = "JEL classification: H41, D72, C92",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1628/001522110X503370",
language = "English",
volume = "66",
pages = "34--64",
journal = "FinanzArchiv",
issn = "0015-2218",
publisher = "Mohr Siebeck",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods

T2 - Experimental Evidence

AU - Rauchdobler, Julian

AU - Sausgruber, Rupert

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

N1 - JEL classification: H41, D72, C92

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed thresholds are ineffective at best and often counterproductive. This holds over a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We test whether thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e., whether a threshold is approved in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and commitment effects, but they are not strong enough to significantly improve the efficiency of thresholds.

AB - Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed thresholds are ineffective at best and often counterproductive. This holds over a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We test whether thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e., whether a threshold is approved in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and commitment effects, but they are not strong enough to significantly improve the efficiency of thresholds.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - provision of public goods

KW - threshold

KW - voting

KW - experiments

U2 - 10.1628/001522110X503370

DO - 10.1628/001522110X503370

M3 - Journal article

VL - 66

SP - 34

EP - 64

JO - FinanzArchiv

JF - FinanzArchiv

SN - 0015-2218

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 20947146